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Ian C. Stewart
SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY

THE ETHICS OF DISCLOSURE
IN COMPANY FINANCIAL
REPORTING IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
1925-1970
Abstract: Ethics is understood as the worthiness of the rights and
needs for accounting information of contending groups in society.
Company law is viewed as a means by which users of financial statements rights and needs have been redressed, and which users have
relatively less important claims for information. The moral idealism
of a true and fair view is being converted into impersonal disclosure
laws which serve to provide, in the main, for the needs of shareholders.

INTRODUCTION
The theme of this paper is the role of mandatory public
disclosure rules in removing the superior information of the
issuers of financial statements (accounters). Specifically, company law is viewed as a means by which the users of financial
statements (accountees') rights to know have been redressed.1 A
diverse and expanded set of accountees are now pressing their
rights to know. Today the list includes shareholders, creditors,
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Honorary Visiting Scholar Program at Regent College and the facilities provided
by the College, in Vancouver, B.C., Canada, where he spent his sabbatical leave
in 1989. The author also thanks his former university, the University of
Auckland for granting the sabbatical.
1Lev [January, 1988] argues that inequity in capital markets leads to adverse
transaction costs, thin markets, low liquidity and in general decreased gains
from trade. Lev contends that such adverse consequences can be mitigated by a
public policy mandating the disclosure of financial information in order to reduce information asymmetries. This paper considers the needs of other users as
well as capital market participants by engaging in ethical reflection on the
growth in disclosure laws.
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labor unions, government, consumers, local neighborhoods and
the public in general [Accounting Standards Steering Committee, 1975]. The necessity for ordering the needs of these
accountees according to perceptions of relative importance
needs to be addressed. These interpersonal comparisons are
what Devine calls "ethics" [1985, Vol III, p. 50, see also Beaver
and Demski, 1974, p. 184; May and Sundem, 1976; American
Accounting Association, 1977, p. 24; Ansari and McDonough,
1980, p. 139]. Devine argues that it is accountants' responsibility
to be the "screening agents for weighing and coordinating interpersonal needs and conflicts" [p. 50].
In terms of the accountability relationship, the accountant
and auditor come between the accounter and the accountees to
"assure a smooth flow of the required information" [Ijiri, Summer 1983, p. 76]. The duty of the accountant and auditor, as
embodied in the inherited structures of accountability, is to an
ideal; namely, to provide "a true and fair view" [Companies Act
of 1981, s. 149]2 of the information flow. The problem, however,
is that the accountant's duty to the ideal of truth and fairness
may not be to the accounter's advantage [Westra, April 1986].
Historically, the personal moral idealism of truth and fairness
has been insufficient to check the egoistic impulses of powerful
companies.3 Hence, there has been a significant acceleration in
minimum disclosure laws throughout the present century. The
objective of this paper is to describe the struggle for the recognition of accountees' rights to know, and whose rights are relatively more important.
Plan of Study
The plan is to examine company law as a dimension that
has contributed to (or repressed) accountees' rights to know.
Successive Companies Acts form part of the discourse of truth
and fairness. Indeed, as Carr puts it, "the process by which specific historical content is given to abstract moral conceptions is
a historical process" [1962, p. 76].

2J. G. Chastney [1975] sets out the changing configuration of ideals embodied in successive Companies Acts and discusses the meaning of the various
terms which have been used.
3Cf. W. R. Kennedy's "The Auditor's Song". "I am the very model of a modern business auditor. I represent the quest for truth no corporation can deter. I
poke my nose in every book and pose my questions quizzical" [1983, p. 22].
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This historical process can also be seen to be shaped within
relations of power [Gordon, 1980]. Powerful industrialists and
professional and trade associations made representations to
Company Law Amendment Committees which preceded the
passage of the Companies Acts during the period covered by
this study. Hence, it is pertinent to raise the question of the
extent to which disclosure laws may be sustaining and legitimizing powerful economic and political groups, while disenfranchising the rights to know of others [Cooper, 1980, p. 164;
Cooper and Sherer, 1984, p. 225; Willmott, 1986, p. 561; Richardson, 1987, p. 351].
The identification and ordering of accountees has been generated in an inductive manner using primary and secondary
source materials. Primary source documents include successive
British Companies Acts along with the Company Law Amendment Committees that immediately preceded the passage of the
legislation.4 These sources constitute the principal evidential
data for weighing the relative importance of the accountees.
Secondary sources consulted included relevant articles from the
periodical literature in accounting.5
Time Period
The minimum disclosure philosophy was first introduced in
the Companies Act of 1907, but was not significantly developed
until the Companies Act of 1929. A Company Law Amendment
Committee was appointed in 1925 to undertake a full review of
the working of the Companies Act then in force. The Committee
reported in 1926, and its report formed the basis for the reforms
of the Companies Acts 1928/29. The accounter's right to privacy
received little opposition prior to this date. It has only been over
the last half century that there has been a gradual evolution
towards disclosure. Since the Act of 1929, there have been three
major enactments in 1947, 1967 and 1981 which have further
developed the theme of minimum disclosure. The Act of 1981,
however, was not preceded by a Company Law Amendment
Committee. It was driven by the harmonizing provisions of the
4Excerpts from these Acts and Reports along with some of the evidence
before the Committees has been brought together very helpfully in two volumes
by Edwards [1980]. Extensive use was made of this material.
5Especially helpful in this regard was the collection by Lee and Parker
[1979].
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4th EC Directive on company law. Hence, the 1981 Act has been
omitted from consideration. Moreover, 1970 saw the advent of
the accounting standards setting program developed by the British accounting profession and thus marked the end of an era in
which major reliance was placed on companies' legislation in
raising the standards of company financial reporting and disclosure.
The rest of the paper is organized along chronological lines.
A section is devoted to each of the major revisions of company
law, which took place in 1928/29, 1947/48 and 1967. The concluding section offers an interpretation of the data used in the
study and emphasizes the relevance of the findings to contemporary education, policy and research issues.
THE CULT OF PRIVACY
The Growing Obscurity of Financial Reports
Edwards [1979, p. 278] reports that in the years up to 1925
accounting information was becoming less informative. Further
support for this view comes from Kitchen [1979, p. 98] and
Edey [1979, pp. 226-7]. Both Edwards [1979, pp. 278-9], and
Kitchen [1979, p. 118] point out that secrecy in financial reporting may well have reflected the difficult conditions facing directors in the 1920s. Kitchen notes that "to many of them, to increase disclosure seemed tantamount to inviting more criticism
— at the least more questions, and many had had their fill of
inquiries." Edwards observes that an explanation of the obscure
reporting practices of some managers lay in their belief that the
decline in demand for their products was of a temporary character and would revive with the imminent up-turn in the trading
cycle [p. 279].
In these particular circumstances, the accounters' moral position may have been act-utilitarian;6 namely, that "it can never
be right to act on the rule of telling the truth if we have good
independent grounds for thinking that it would be for the greatest general good not to tell the truth" [Frankena, 1963, p. 30].

6"Act-utilitarians hold that in general, or at least where it is practicable, one
is to tell what is right or obligatory by appealing directly to the principle of
utility or, in other words, by trying to see which of the actions open to him will
or is likely to produce the greatest balance of good over evil in the universe"
[Frankena, 1963, p. 30].
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Public disclosure of poor performance may precipitate the failure of the company with consequent loss to the investing public
and the workforce.
Greene Committee
The Greene Committee on Company Law Amendment,
which sat in 1925, circulated among some 44 individuals and
institutions, including the Co-operative Congress and the Trades
Union Congress, for their views on the existing state of company law. Edwards [1980, p. xvi] reports that 39 submissions
were made to the Committee including both written and oral
evidence from the Co-operative Congress, but no submission
was received from the Trades Union Congress. Accountancy
bodies made representations to the Greene Committee for the
first time in the long history of company reform (dating back to
1867).
At the time, accepted conventions "left a fairly wide area of
accounting discretion to company management and auditors"
[Yamey, 1979, p. 237]. In practice, the exercise of accounting
discretion.... was conditioned in general by an approved bias
towards conservatism' " [p. 237]. But, as Yamey observes, the
creation of secret reserves "went well beyond the caution of this
ordinary conservatism" [p. 237]. Edwards [1979, p. 280] notes
that overall secret reserves received approval from those witnesses who gave evidence. Mr. F. Whinney felt that shareholders
might be entitled to know of their existence although not the
details relating to them [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 101]. Both
the Law Society [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 102] and the Institute of Chartered Accountants [Edwards, 1980 Vol. II, p. 120]
took the view that a balance sheet prepared to give full protection to creditors would give away information to competitors.
The giving of an "externality" to competitors is a theme which
runs throughout the period reviewed here. Both institutions
contended that the remedy for shareholders was to ask questions at the annual meeting. As Garnsey [1922] observed,
"shareholders as a rule are quick to appreciate the dangers attending a too full statement of the affairs of their company and
rely to an almost unlimited extent upon the advice tendered to
them by their Board" [quoted in Kitchen, 1979, p. 94]. This
accepts the "necessity" of the shareholders' welfare being given
overriding consideration in determining the greatest balance of
good over evil [Edwards, 1979, p. 277].
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As far as creditors are concerned, both the Law Society and
the Institute took the view [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 102 and p.
120] that creditors' means of protection was largely in their own
hands — they must pursue their own inquiries. Both submissions asserted that creditors could obtain as much information
about the financial position of a company as they could about
that of an individual. Both concluded "It is impossible by legislation to protect fools from their own folly" [Edwards, 1980,
Vol. II, p. 102, and p. 120].
The Greene Committee appears to have accepted the view
that additional disclosures should be kept to an absolute minimum. The Committee argued that it would be "most undesirable, in order to defeat an occasional wrong doer, to impose
restrictions which would seriously hamper the activities of honest men and would inevitably re-act upon the commerce and
prosperity of the country" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 79]. The
Committee appealed to the concept of utility. The system of
limited liability leaves opportunity for abuse, but these costs are
outweighed by the benefits to trade and industry. The report did
include proposals for minimum disclosure in the balance sheet.
The report also recommended that the balance sheet and the
profit and loss account be presented to the members at each
annual meeting, and the former document be circulated to the
members prior to the meeting. It was further recommended that
a copy of the last audited balance sheet be filed annually with
the Registrar of Companies [Edwards, 1979, p. 281].
Companies Act of 1928
The Companies Act followed the recommendations made by
the Greene Committee in connection with accounting matters.
It included requirements for companies to distinguish between
the amounts of fixed assets and floating assets, to show balances for several named intangible assets and to provide a small
amount of information concerning subsidiary companies. Moreover, the Act required, for the first time, that directors were
responsible for circulating the accounts to members prior to the
annual general meeting. Section 39(4) also called for a directors'
report to be attached to the balance sheet. A "real advance"
[Edey, 1979, p. 228] was the requirement to present a profit and
loss account (which need not be audited) to those shareholders
in attendance at the annual meeting. Sections 6(d) and 39(4)
made it clear that only the balance sheet and the directors' re-
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port presented to the company at a general meeting need to be
filed with the Registrar. This innovation illustrates a continuing
"preoccupation with the shareholder group" [Edwards, 1980,
Vol. I, p. xvi]. Presumably, the profit and loss account was not
required to be filed with the Registrar because it was thought to
give an unfair advantage to a competitor.
In this period, disclosure is viewed as an intramural problem of the directors and the shareholders. To give shareholders
greater rights to know would result in benefit to competitors.
Moreover, enforced disclosure in the difficult economic conditions facing directors in the 1920s may have precipitated the
collapse of the company with consequent loss to the general
public and the work force. It was not until 1931 that
management's right to privacy was seriously challenged in the
Royal Mail case.
THE ROYAL MAIL CASE
Edwards observes that in the months following the introduction of the 1929 Act there was a general improvement in
reporting practices particularly on the assets side of the balance
sheet [1979, p. 284]. Nevertheless, profit manipulation and the
maintenance of secret reserves persisted. Edwards states "it is
fairly clear that where the Act placed some specific obligation
on directors, this was complied with. Where no such obligation
was imposed, information did not gratuitously emerge" [p. 285].
This aroused accountants and others to criticize the value
of the audit function. The auditor had been required since the
Act of 1900 to report on the truth and correctness of the accounts. The most well known failure of the auditor to fulfill that
duty occurred in the Royal Mail case [Brooks, 1933]. Briefly,
Lord Kylsant, chairman of the shipping line, and the company's
auditor, H. J. Morland, were accused of deliberately misleading
shareholders as to the true state of the company's financial position. The line had been doing badly since 1921; and from 1926,
Kylsant, with the knowledge of the auditor, had been transferring large sums out of excess tax provisions and non-recurring
items of revenue to help pay dividends. Neither the transfers
from reserves nor the company's true trading losses were disclosed in the annual accounts. The only notice given to shareholders that the profit had been derived from the utilization of
secret reserves were the words "including adjustment of taxation reserves" inserted in the balance sheet by Morland.

Published by eGrove, 1991

7

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 18 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 3
42

The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1991

Morland was acquitted on a charge of dishonesty because he
had merely adopted a customary practice. It is interesting that
the company had published information concerning profitability in the early years of the century despite the absence of any
company law requirements, but in common with those of other
hard pressed firms, the accounts gradually revealed less and less
[Edwards, 1979, p. 288]. It was this case, more than any other
single event, that secured the shareholders' rights to a candid
disclosure of profits.
The correlative duty on management not to hide information is implied in the special relationship which management
has with its shareholders. Managers are the agents of the shareholders and promise to represent the interests of the shareholders and to appraise them of their progress in this regard. This is
a deontological justification for disclosure.7 Edwards reflects the
shift that was taking place: "It is preferable to alarm one's shareholders by frank disclosure of the financial position than to
keep them in a fool's paradise until it is too late for a remedy to
be possible" [Edwards, 1979, p. 290].
It is interesting that the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales (ICAEW) continued to call for reform to
be effected "through the influence of individual members and
that there was no need for further legislation" [quoted by
Kitchen and Parker, 1980, p. 77]. The Institute felt, on the one
hand, that general pronouncements could easily be circumvented or misapplied, while on the other hand, detailed pronouncements were impracticable because of the diversity of
business situations. By contrast, the Society of Incorporated Accountants argued that it was "unreasonable to expect the auditor to progress beyond the minimum requirements laid down by
the law; these were regarded as constituting an effective limit on
his powers" [Edwards, 1979, p. 290].
It took another decade, however, before it was realized that
an increase in moral goodwill was not sufficient to offer shareholders protection of their rights. Zeff records that there was
still much dissatisfaction in the late 1930s and early 1940s with
accounting practices. It was following a series of articles published in The Economist in 1942 concerning the inadequacies of
7Deontologists "assert that there are . . . other considerations which make an
action or rule right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its consequences — certain features of the act itself other than the value it brings
into existence . . . " [Frankena, 1963, p. 14].
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published accounts, that the ICAEW changed its attitude to one
of issuing recommendations on best practice to members [Zeff,
1972, p. 10].
UTMOST PUBLICITY
An Expansion in Number of Accountees
The early recommendations of the ICAEW formed the basis
of the sweeping reforms in the accounting requirements which
were recommended by the Cohen Committee on Company Law
Amendment in a report published in 1945. The terms of reference given to the Committee included an obligation to review
the "safeguards afforded for investors and for the public interest" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 128]. As Edwards observes, formal recognition of the public interest indicates the extent to
which official attitudes had changed during the time since the
Greene Committee. This can be seen as a reflection of the
changes in social attitudes stimulated by the war [Bircher,
Spring 1988, p. 117].
In keeping with the call for social justice and a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, it was argued by representatives of The Economist [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 181] and
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p.
212], which was making a submission to a Company Law
Amendment Committee for the first time, that some standards
for accounting information were necessary now that financial
reports were serving a wider audience.
The TUC appealed to the public interest or general utility in
its submissions. It contended that the public's and workers'
rights to know should outweigh any competitive disadvantage
suffered by the company [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 207]. In
response to the suggestion that publication of information
about reserves would lead to a dog fight between management
and the unions, the TUC representatives stated that it was not in
their interests to raid the reserves if it was going to put the
company on the rocks [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 208]. TUC
representatives argued that dissemination of more information
would improve confidence and understanding between labor
and capital [p. 207].
The Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants
drew the Committee's attention to the changed position of
shareholders since the Greene Committee met. Instead of being
a responsible proprietorship, shareholders were mere dividend
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recipients, or investors seeking capital accretion. They argued
that the controlling and functioning of companies now resided,
in a vast majority of cases, with the directors and that there was
a need to ensure that the directors (and shareholders) "shall not
be able to conduct the business of a company as to secure for
their interests a priority position as against the interests of others" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 192, see also Pollard, 1969, p.
163 and Hannah, 1983, p. 27].8
Several submissions pointed out that the phrase a "true and
correct view" was becoming "distorted by secret reserves"
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 181 (The Economist), p. 197, (de
Paula)]. The Association of Certified Accountants, in their submission, set out in some detail a number of specified items
which should be disclosed in order for accounts to exhibit a true
and correct view [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 193]. The Association also drew attention to the auditors' lack of independence.
They noted that it is not infrequent for auditors, conceiving it
their duty to draw attention to some particular feature in the
accounts, to find themselves at variance with the directors and
lose their appointment [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 193].
Cohen Committee
Whereas "confidentiality" had been the watchword of the
Greene Committee, "fullest practicable disclosure" was the objective identified by the Cohen Committee [Edwards, 1980, Vol.
I. p. xvi]. This illustrates the change which had taken place in
attitudes to disclosure. The Committee considered that utmost
publicity would reduce the opportunities for abuse and accord
with a wakening social consciousness [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p.
130]. The report argued that the hands of the auditor would be
strengthened if the law were to prescribe a minimum amount of
information to be disclosed in all balance sheets and profit and
loss accounts [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 131 and p. 137]. The
Committee recommended that audits be conducted by fully
qualified accountants. It suggested that auditors' independence
be strengthened by disqualifying an employee of a company or
an employee or partner of a director from being its auditor. As

8This argument parallels those put forth by Berle and Means [1932] across
the Atlantic, in which the authors suggest that the new concentrations of corporate power must now "serve not alone the owners or the control, but all society."
[1967, p. 312].
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Willmott [1986, p. 560] points out "to maintain their position
within the prevailing structure of power relations, the officers of
professional bodies are obliged to gain the recognition and confidence not only of clients but also, and crucially, of the state."
Other recommendations included giving the auditors the right
to attend all general meetings (not just those general meetings
where accounts are discussed), and the right, if other auditors
have been nominated, or if there is a proposal that they should
not be reappointed, to put their views before the shareholders
orally at the meeting and in writing prior to the meeting.
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, pp. 148-150].
One final matter worth noting about the Cohen Report is
that the Committee considered the profit and loss account "as
important as, if not more important than, the balance sheet,
since the trend of profits is the best indication of the prosperity
of the company and the value of the assets depends largely on
the maintenance of the business as a going concern" [Edwards,
1980, Vol. II. p. 137]. In keeping with this, the Committee
sought to bring the profit and loss account within the purview
of the auditors' report. This no doubt accorded with the growing
number of absentee owners wishing to evaluate the performance of the company and to assess how much of the profit
was available for distribution as dividends.
Companies Act of 1947
The Companies Act of 1947 was based largely on the extensive recommendations of the Cohen Committee. It required auditors to report whether the accounts were true and fair rather
than true and correct. The replacement of the word correct by
fair was at the suggestion of the English Institute [Edwards,
1980, Vol. II, p. 167]. The Act prescribed specific disclosures
which it regarded as the minimum necessary for the purpose of
attaining a true and fair view. However, the Act made it clear
that true and fair was an overriding requirement. This considerably expanded the concept of minimum disclosure.
The influence of the Royal Mail case on the legislation was
obvious: among other things, the Act called for full disclosure of
all reserves and movements therein, the reporting on the profit
and loss account by the auditor, the adequate classification of
accounts, the introduction of special requirements for holding
companies, and the disclosure of further details in prospectuses.
Other important extensions of the law were that both the bal-
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ance sheet and the profit and loss account had to be filed with
the Register, and private companies no longer enjoyed immunity from the obligation to file accounts. In addition, the auditor
now had to be a member of a professional body. However, as
Willmott [1986, p. 565] points out, the price exacted by the
State for the sanctioning of market shelters for professional
groups was the "reliable production and delivery of relevant and
consistent knowledge and skill".
It was now clear that no longer could the auditor rely on his
own experience and strength of character in any contest with
the directors. Statutory support was necessary to restore a measure of trust in the moral capacities of the accounters and to
encourage an expansion rather than contraction of these capacities [cf. Niebuhr, 1932, p. 272]. The consequent impact on the
quality of financial reporting "was little short of tremendous"
[quoted in Zeff, 1972, p. 13]. "The justice which results from
such a process may not belong in the category of morally created social values, if morality be defined purely from the perspective of the individual. From the viewpoint of society itself it
does represent a moral achievement" [Niebuhr, 1932, p. 31-32].
In sum, it took the Royal Mail case (1933) to bring about a
greater recognition of shareholders' rights to know. With the
divorce of ownership from control, managers had a moral duty
(reflecting a deontological approach) to appraise shareholders
of their progress. Also, it took the war and the awakening social
consciousness that it brought to bring about a recognition of
the public's rights to know.
GREATER PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
Responsibilities to Investors and the Work Force
The Report of the Company Law Committee under the
Chairmanship of Lord Jenkins was presented to Parliament in
June 1962. The range of interested parties giving oral evidence
before the Committee had extended to include among others,
The Society of Investment Analysts Limited, The Institute of
Directors, The Institute of Actuaries, The Association of Unit
Trust Managers, The British Overseas Banks Association, The
Association of International Accountants Limited, The Faculty
of Advocates, and accounting academics.
The question of the competitive disadvantage of disclosure
was once again discussed. Professor Baxter argued that the public interest (general utility) should override the interests of
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shareholders in this regard [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 294].
Baxter argued that "the more economic information there is the
more prosperous we shall be." In his view, the only objectionable thing "would be if for some reason Competitor A could
limit the knowledge available to Competitors B and C; we are
saying the thing should be published to the whole world"
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 297].9 In his memorandum to the
Committee, Baxter developed the case for full disclosure.
In a free economy, resources are guided to their most
fruitful uses (in the main) by the decisions of individuals. If the economy is to work efficiently, these decisions must be based on adequate information. Investors should have available the fullest and clearest data
on the working of the various sectors. Guided by such
data, they will put new resources into sectors where
likely returns are highest — thus helping to give the
consumer what he wants, and to reduce abnormally
high profit rates to the competitive level. The society
that fails to provide itself with the best available information is wasting resources, and keeping its income
needlessly low . . . [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 298].
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Society of Investment Analysts [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 316 and p. 320]. This,
of course, raises the "public good/free rider" problem. While
investment analysts get information "free", others such as owners, employees, or consumers must bear the costs of producing
the information through smaller dividends, lower wages, or the
payment of higher prices, respectively.
The Trades Union Congress once more drew attention to
the priority of the public's right to know over the shareholders.
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 346]. The TUC posed the question for
the committee: "What are the respective rights of the public and
the companies?" It focused its remarks on the need for product
line reporting arguing that they were disadvantaged in negotiations by not knowing the profitability of particular products.

9Professor Bell has argued recently that "if disclosure costs are negligible. .
.but disclosure improves the long run efficiency in the economy overall, then a
case can be made for mandating disclosure even where the entity making the
disclosure seems to be hurt, competitively, in the process. The disclosing entity
benefits from externalities when other entities disclose. And it will have benefited from 'first use' of its cost cutting measure or measures." [1989, p. 61].
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The TUC lamented that the information useful to employees
was really only a by-product of information published for shareholders. It then argued for reports specifically pitched at employees to enable workers to form a view of the company. However, these reports did not eventuate until later in the nineteen
seventies [see Burchell, Clubb, and Hopwood, 1985, p. 398].
Presumably, knowing that a company has a substantial profit
on a particular product should also lead to new investment,
perhaps by competitors in that product.
Jenkins Committee
The Jenkins Report repeated the views expressed by the
Greene and Cohen Committees as to the undesirability of imposing restrictions which would seriously hamper the activities
of honest men in order to defeat an occasional wrongdoer
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 219]. In considering the trend toward
additional disclosures, however, the Committee posed the question of the value of the information to the persons receiving it,
and whether its ascertainment would involve an amount of
work disproportionate to its value or whether publication might
be detrimental to the company's business, and thus indirectly
detrimental to its shareholders and creditors [Edwards, 1980,
Vol. II, p. 219].
The Committee argued for greater disclosure of information
about subsidiaries, directors' compensation, and in the directors' report, information on the activities of the company including the difference between the current market value of the
fixed assets and their book values. In the balance sheet, the
Committee recommended the following disclosures: the aggregate amount of fixed assets acquired or disposed of or destroyed
during the year, the basis of valuation of inventories, and the
aggregate amount of the company's quoted and unquoted investments. Land was to be subdivided among freehold, long
leasehold or short leasehold. Where fixed assets were shown at
valuation — the name of the valuers, their qualifications and
the basis of valuation. In the profit and loss account, turnover
was to be disclosed and the method of calculation for the year
stated. Income from quoted and unquoted investments was to
be shown separately.
The Committee also recommended the abolition of the exempt private company in order to protect those who trade and
extend credit to such companies [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p.
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223]. The exempt private company had been introduced by the
1947 Act to make available to the one owner or family-owned
company the advantages of trading as an incorporated company
without requiring from it the disclosure of information.
Companies Act of 1967
The Companies Act of 1967 made it mandatory for all companies incorporated with the privilege of limited liability to file
accounts with the Registrar, including an auditors' report and
the directors' report. Thus, the new Act meant that businessmen
formerly using the exempt private company had to decide between the value of maintaining the right of privacy as to their
financial affairs, compared with the privilege of trading with
limited liability.
The Act accelerated the trend, evident in the earlier legislation examined, of greater public accountability. Nearly all the
proposals of the Jenkins Committee relating to disclosure were
implemented. Some provisions of the Act may be attributable to
the case presented to the Jenkins Committee by the TUC for
disclosure of information of interest to Unions and employees
and also as a basis for public policy.
CONCLUSIONS
In the 1920s, disclosure was viewed as a matter of internal
management to be determined by the articles and the decisions
of the directors and members. This laissez faire attitude was
underpinned by the belief that the greatest possible freedom
should be allowed to those responsible for the management of
companies. Professional bodies, making representations before
the Greene Committee, felt that compulsory disclosure was not
desirable, rather they appealed to the mechanism of shareholders' democracy at the annual meeting of the company. The English Institute took the view that it was "impossible by legislation to protect fools from their own folly". Two other factors
appear to have been influential. First, secrecy would prevent
any advantage accruing to competitors, and second, privacy
may also enable the company to weather any temporary setback in the demand for its products. The cult of privacy could
be justified on utilitarian grounds, which, as Garnsey notes,
shareholders were quick to appreciate, assuming the "givens" of
their viewpoint.
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The Royal Mail case showed how management could use its
control over information in annual accounts in a manner which
can misrepresent company performance. The case established
shareholders' right to candid disclosure of company performance. The correlative duty on management not to conceal information is implied in the fiduciary relationship which management has with its shareholders. The emphasis on
rights-based, deontological theories was given further impetus
by the war. In particular, it was argued that a directorship
should be a species of moral trusteeship, towards the British
nation [quoted by Bircher, 1988, p. 117]. No longer was disclosure an intramural affair of the directors and the members of
the company. It was recognized that the law must protect the
rights of outsiders and that some standards in the presentation
of this information were necessary. As the TUC representatives
contended before the Cohen Committee in 1944, workers are
entitled to know the facts underlying the calculation of wages.
Secrecy and secret reserves were contributing to suspicion and
a lack of confidence. With the control of companies increasingly
in the hands of professional managers, it was argued that the
law should protect the investor, the outside creditor, and the
general public. The English Institute, which had earlier opposed
compulsory disclosure legislation, now strongly advocated it.
This may be understood to have enabled them to extract from
the government a license for the control of the supply of professional workers to the market. The Institute's recommendations
became the basis of sweeping reforms put forward by the Cohen
Committee and subsequently enacted in companies legislation
in 1947. The legislation greatly strengthened the auditor's position by prescribing a minimum of information to be disclosed
in all balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. This increased the credibility of financial reports.
A further increase in the number of organizations and persons concerned with accounting results is apparent from the list
of those giving evidence before the Jenkins Committee in 19601961. A leading academic, Professor W. T. Baxter, argued the
case for disclosure on the grounds of its role in the efficient
allocation of capital for investment. The TUC pressed its call for
more equitable returns for labor based on a break down of
profit figures for product lines. The TUC requested reports specifically tailored to enable workers to form a view of the company. These extensions of disclosure were justified in utilitarian

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol18/iss1/3

16

Stewart: Ethics of disclosure in company financial reporting in the United Kingdom, 1925-1970
Stewart: Ethics of Disclosure in Company Financial Reporting

51

terms as information which would be in the interests of the
public at large [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 336] accepting the
necessities of the employee viewpoint. Some provisions of the
Companies Act of 1967 can be attributed to these submissions,
for example, s. 17 of the Act required the Directors' report to
disclose the turnover and profitability of classes of business
where these differ substantially from each other.
These reforms have been the only sure means of inducing a
true and fair view. However, shareholders have been the dominant group whose interests were being served. It was not until
1980 that the Companies Act laid an obligation on directors to
consider the interests of employees "as well as the interests of
its members."
The relevance of this study to two contemporary problems
will be considered briefly. The first is education. Successive
Companies Acts have spelled out with increasing specificity the
information necessary for attaining a true and fair view. The
difficulty with this approach is that the disclosure laws came to
be seen as autonomous from the morality of truth and fairness.
Although Benson (later Lord) said in evidence before the
Jenkins Committee in 1961 that true and fair has become "ingrained in the profession" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 366], values such as these must be actively protected from erosion
[Demant, 1952, p. 115]. Today truth and fairness are regarded
as problematic [Rutherford, 1985, Puxty et al., 1987, p. 285;
Willmott, 1986, pp. 575-6]. As Frankena warned "principles
without traits are impotent" [1963, p. 53], and "having a moral
ideal is wanting to be a person of a certain sort, having certain
traits of character rather than others" [p. 54]. Educators therefore need to rediscover the ethics of character or virtue, a type
of ethics that places primacy on the formation of the moral self
[Hauerwas, 1974].
The second issue is policy making. Both shareholders and
employees have appealed to deontological and utilitarian theories. Each assumes that moral conflict can be resolved by a
single fundamental principle. The assumption underlying the
capitalist-utilitarian ideal, for instance, is that the common
good equals the greatest sum of individual satisfaction. The
policy formed on this basis must therefore be the result of a
coalescence of self interest. Puxty et al. [1987, p. 275], highlight
the hardiness of laissez faire ideology and the significance of the
City of London as a world financial center in explaining the
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regulation which emerged. The authors suggest that the market
principle of dispersed competition through economic entrepreneurship and calculative rationality is predominant.
The problem is that justice in utilitarian terms is conceived
only as a procedural requirement. The demand of the common
good is to seek, form and maintain a rational community (not
just a harmonizing of interests) [Hauerwas, 1974, p. 237]. To
formulate and envision such a good and make it efficacious for
all accountees remains the challenge which faces policy makers
and researchers alike [Willmott, 1986, p. 574].
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